

October 15, 1943

S O C I A L

A C T I O N

Main Springs of
WORLD POLITICS

by Brooks Emeny



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024

SOCIAL ACTION

Published by the Council for Social Action of the
Congregational Christian Churches

289 Fourth Avenue

New York 10, N. Y.

October 15, 1943

NOBLE S. ELDERKIN, *Chairman*

ELIZABETH G. WHITING, *Associate Director and Editor*

CONTENTS

THE IDEAL AND THE JOB	2
MAINSPRINGS OF WORLD POLITICS <i>by Brooks Emery</i>	5
INTRODUCTION	5
1. THE MAP	12
2. WORLD GEOGRAPHY	19
3. THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR	24
4. THE ECONOMIC FACTOR	37
5. THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR	48
6. THE STRATEGIC FACTOR	59
7. U. S. POST-WAR POSITION	74
(All Illustrations by Graphic Associates)	
HOW WORLD MAPS ARE MADE <i>by B. T.</i>	87

SOCIAL ACTION, Volume IX, Number 8, October 15, 1943. Published monthly except July and August. Subscription \$1.00 per year; Canada, \$1.20 per year. Single copies, this issue, 25c; 10 or more copies, 15c each. Reentered as second-class matter January 30, 1939, at the Post Office at New York, under the Act of March 3, 1879.



THE IDEAL AND THE JOB

The Mainsprings of World Politics are wound up, coiled, and ready at any moment, if suddenly released, to raise havoc with every plan. Properly ordered and wisely manipulated, they provide the dynamic of progress, peace and happiness.

Few of us stop to consider the forces that hold us back or drive us on. We think we can make decisions and live our lives as if we were starting at scratch, perfectly free to choose our course and aim for our objectives without respect to inheritance and environment. Which is pure nonsense. We can choose and we can aim—but not simply as we wish. All that has happened in the past affects our choice. Circumstances in the present influence our aim. We are free—but within limits. Only those who recognize the limits have any freedom at all.

This is just by way of saying that Mr. Emeny's article is a good corrective. A good corrective of the tendency—sentimental and bland—to talk about the “new world order” and the “winning of the peace,” as if all we have to do is make up our minds, fill our hearts with goodwill and then go out and get Utopia. This kind of thing does more harm than good. It ignores all the powerful factors involved in political, economic and cultural development. It is sheer wishful thinking coupled with futile planning. Christians need to steer clear of such temptations.

The task set for statesmanship, economic leadership and public education in these years and those to come is almost overwhelming. It will surely overwhelm us unless we can see and rightly


judge the conditions under which our work has to be done. These are laid down by history, geography, habit and human nature. They can, indeed, be changed. They are being changed. But only by those who know them, understand them and have the skill to handle them with precision.

Christian idealism provides another dynamic—the power derived from universal or cosmic mainsprings. This is the inner or spiritual imperative which drives men and women to desire and insist upon the proper use and manipulation of the vast forces that lie outside and around them. But Christian idealism is not enough. It is no substitute for wisdom, nor can it by itself provide the good judgment necessary to this exacting task. Knowledge is the prime ingredient: knowledge of the facts, but of more than facts. Knowledge made up of information, analysis, discrimination and the sort of synthesis that creates something better out of the materials at hand. In the profoundest sense it is true, more true than ever before, that realistic “know how” will make all the difference between building a real world order and creating the worst mess that mankind has ever had to wallow in through centuries of darkness and woe.

Mr. Emeny has added greatly to our “know how.” Let the Christian idealist dig into this article, and let the person who wants to get on with the job stop long enough to find out about this machine called civilization.

Peace is an ideal. But the achievement of peace is a job. “Listen to the spirit,” says the mystic. “Grip the machine,” says the man of action. Yes—but there is someone else to be heard from. “Wait,” he urges. “The machine is complicated. Before you grip it, find out how.”

POTENTIAL RESOURCES OF COAL, IRON ORE & WATER POWER



EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 5% OF WORLD POTENTIAL RESOURCES

■ COAL ▲ IRON ● WATER POWER

MAINSPRINGS OF WORLD POLITICS

Brooks Emeny

Introduction

The history of the modern world has been marked by four great peace settlements: Westphalia, 1648, which brought to a close the Thirty Years War; Utrecht, 1713, which ended the War of the Spanish Succession; Vienna, 1815, which followed the defeat of Napoleon; and Versailles, 1919, which terminated World War I.

BEGINNING OF THE MODERN STATE

Of these four settlements the Peace of Westphalia was historically the most significant in several respects. In the first place, it brought to a close a long succession of bloody religious conflicts and settled the principle that Europe could remain half Catholic and half Protestant. But even more important, it established the idea of the nation as a sovereign independent unit, and defined the modern state system.

Europe at that time marked the limits of Western civilization, except for certain colonial areas. The other regions of the earth were either unexplored or comprised the peoples of Oriental and Mohammedan culture, to whom the concept of the sovereign independent state was completely foreign.

Since that time the world has become universally organized along the lines of the European state system. As Western civilization has spread and embraced the entire surface of the earth,

all peoples have accepted the idea of the territorially defined sovereign independent state. Under this system no nation owes allegiance to a higher sovereign authority nor brooks any interference with its internal or external affairs, unless by its own choice or through forced submission to the superior power of another state or coalition.

"THE BALANCE OF POWER"

It is in these respects that the Peace Settlements of Utrecht, Vienna and Versailles are historically of great interest. Each marked the reconstruction of the state system following a tremendous upheaval which arose from the attempt of a single nation or coalition to destroy that system by conquest. Thus the idea of Louis XIV and of Napoleon that France should dominate the Continent and thereby upset "the balance of power" between the nations of Europe, was as intolerable to British sovereign interests as to the other nations, victims of French conquests. The similar ambitions of Germany under Wilhelm II and Hitler have been productive of identical reactions, though on a tremendous world-wide scale.

Wars have existed from earliest times between groups of mankind. They are not, therefore, peculiar to the nation-state system. In fact the Western world has known but two periods of relative peace. The first of these periods existed during the single sovereignty of the Roman Empire. Only "barbarians" lived outside and they were beyond the pale of Roman civilization and law. The second period prevailed during the medieval papacy, under whose temporal powers some moderating influence over the conflicting ambitions of ruling princes was exercised. In neither instance, however, did the sovereign independent state, as we understand it, exist.

PRINCES, PEOPLES, AND "ECONOMIC NATIONALISM"

With the development of the nation-state system, the nature of wars has varied from century to century. Between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution, conflicts between nations were primarily dynastic struggles. The rivalry of the sovereign princes for possession of larger territories and colonial holdings typified this period. But since Europe was composed of sovereign independent states, the attempt of any one or combination of them to gain sufficient power to threaten the security of the others, served to upset the existing equilibrium. Thus the balance-of-power system became the natural by-product of the nation-state system. The wars of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of Kaiser Wilhelm II and of Nazi Germany have each in turn challenged that system with identical reactions on the part of nations whose security was thereby threatened.

But if the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were largely dynastic, those of the nineteenth and twentieth have become primarily nationalistic. It was the French Revolution that introduced a new phase in the conflict of states by giving rise in Europe and the rest of the world to a strong spirit of nationalism. During most of the nineteenth century this generally took the form of irredentist or ethnic struggles, motivated by the desire of groups of people with like background and customs, or speaking the same language, to unite under a single sovereignty. The unification of Italy, through the efforts of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and of Germany under Bismarck, were both an expression of this desire and resulted in the creation of two Great Powers.

World War I gave impetus to another force with explosive potentialities, i.e., economic nationalism. This came as a natural result of the ever-tightening squeeze of competition between nations unequal one to another, and territorially limited in many cases both as to the means of livelihood and of power.

LAWS FOR NATIONS

But while wars have become more extended and devastating, there have likewise been considerable developments with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the techniques of international organization. Since the writings of Grotius some three hundred years ago there has evolved a large body of public and international law. The conduct of nations among themselves has become more regularized in certain respects through universally accepted treaty engagements. But unlike domestic law, this vast body of rules of conduct has not received the necessary sanction of police power. Its only sanction has been the voluntary acceptance and good will of the sovereign states themselves.

Similarly in the realm of international government, a signal growth in administrative technique and arbitration has taken place. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed frequent convenings of important world assemblies, devoted not only to peace arrangements following war but likewise to the adjustment of causes of conflict.

NATIONAL INTERESTS VS. INTERNATIONAL LAW

This long-established practice of international conference received recognition of permanent need under the Covenant of the League of Nations after 1919. All elements of national government, legislative, executive, administrative and judicial, were to be discovered in the League in the form of the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat and the World Court. But adequate authority for these bodies was lacking in case of serious disagreement between the nations party to the Covenant, except for a degree of moral force.

Despite the unprecedented expansion of machinery for preserving peace which has taken place during the twentieth cen-

tury, wars have increased rather than decreased in extent and devastation. For no nation, and particularly no Great Power, has been willing to accede to the jurisdiction of the League, or to any other international body, in matters affecting vital national interests. And modern technology has placed armaments in the hands of nations with a destructive power beyond anything known to human history.

Since states have remained faithful to the doctrine of national sovereignty they have refused to conform their policies in essential matters to the dictates of public international interest. Similarly, in resisting the sanction of international law, the creation of an international police force, and the exercise of super-state authority, they have continued to interpret attempts at regional or world jurisdiction in their own affairs as a direct challenge to their sovereign rights and interests.

Under these conditions the pledge of the nations, signatories to the Kellogg Pact in 1928, to "renounce war as an instrument of national policy" was nothing more than an absurdity. No nation renounced thereby its right to proceed according to its own interpretation of its national interests. Nor did the signatories pledge the use of their armed forces either unilaterally or collectively to punish violators of the Pact.

ARMAMENTS AND RAW MATERIALS

Since states have been unwilling to subject their vital national interests to the restraints of international authority, it has followed naturally that they have sought to clothe their policies with force. Armaments in fact have always been the most familiar prerogative of sovereignty. But in the modern Age of Industrialism, only those nations which possessed the natural resources for the establishment of heavy industries could create the sinews of power necessary to maintain their individual sovereign rights

against all challenging authority. Thus a premium has been placed upon the possession or availability of the industrial raw materials and agricultural resources of the world, since a nation's ability to defend its rights depends upon its own strength in relation to its neighbors'.

Fundamentally, then, the central dilemma of international relations derives from the fact that the absence of super-state authority imposes upon each country ultimate dependence upon its own resources in the defense of its security. While ordinarily the ends of national policy will be achieved by peaceful means, once the gathering forces of recrimination, fear and greed become overwhelming, there remains no arbitrament but that of force.

WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS

But although war as an instrument of policy must naturally enter into the calculations of every nation, it becomes of critical importance for world relations only when the Great Powers are involved. For it is the Great Powers who possess the industries essential to the extensive manufacture of modern arms. The smaller states find themselves in a position of virtually complete dependence, wherein they have become the hapless as well as the helpless victims of the vicious workings of the modern state system. There can be no more eloquent proof of this than the fact that the Great Powers and China alone make possible the continuance of the present war. All the smaller nations have become either direct victims of conquest by the aggressors, or are but limited participants, or benevolent neutrals in the conflict.

Not all the Great Powers have resorted to war as a matter of choice. For it is evident that Soviet Russia, the United States, the British Empire and France desired nothing more than to be left alone. The same of course is true of China. These were nations

whose territories were large and rich and who had no designs upon the lands of their neighbors. Germany, Japan and Italy on the other hand, had been far from satisfied with their lot. Being without many of the basic raw material essentials of industrialized power, they sought to reinforce their position through the expansion of their territories and areas of economic control.

To the student of world affairs, therefore, it is evident that one is confronted with two mutually exclusive expressions of the national policies of different states, those which are static and those which are dynamic. This is indeed the very heart of the problem of peace in the contemporary world. For it appears to be posed by the demand of one group of peoples for security based on the maintenance of the status quo, and of another for security attainable only, in their view, by a modification of the status quo.

OUR PLACE IN THE WORLD

At the close of the present war, this dilemma of power politics will have reached an even more acute stage. For in place of seven Great Powers only three, the United States, Soviet Russia and the British Empire will have emerged intact and powerfully armed. The destiny of all other peoples will be determined primarily by the initial decisions and policies of this exclusive and limited triumvirate. Of the three, the position taken by the United States as to the future peace will become a portent for good or evil beyond anything heretofore known in human history.


It is these basic considerations of world affairs which are to be the subject of the pages which follow. And the first essential in the understanding of them is a knowledge of the Map.

1. The Map

A globe provides the only accurate representation of the earth's surface. But it has certain disadvantages. We cannot carry it around for reference wherever we go. The human eye, moreover, is incapable of seeing the entire surface all at once. Despite obvious inaccuracies, therefore, the flat surface map is more useful in the study of a world in which the problems of any part must be considered in relation to the whole.

Every flat surface map of the globe will of necessity produce certain misrepresentations. The purposes for which each is designed, therefore, have to be clearly understood and accompanying distortions taken into account. No single map can fulfill every need. This is particularly true in a world of aviation and

MERCATOR'S PROJECTION



speedy transport, where global war and the problems of global peace have completely changed our conceptions of geography.

THE MERCATOR MAP

Broadly speaking, the three most familiar types of world maps are: the Mercator projection, and the so-called "Polar" and "Equal Area" projections. The first of these was originally designed by the Flemish geographer Gerhard Mercator, over three hundred years ago, and adopted by European navigators of sailing ships. It provided a means for plotting the true directions of the compass, whether one sailed around Africa to the shores of Asia or crossed the Atlantic to the Americas.

But the Mercator map has serious disadvantages. For instance the North and South Poles, each of which is only a point on the globe, become lines equal in length to the equator. This has the obvious effect of exaggerating disproportionately the land and sea areas as one approaches the Polar regions from the equator. Greenland and Scandinavia appear to be large land masses overhanging the continents of North America and Europe respectively, while Siberia fairly dwarfs China and India.

Another distortion of the Mercator projection is the representation it gives of the relative positions of the Americas and Eurasia. These two continents appear to lie side by side. In reality they both stem from the North Polar ice cap in such a manner that the west coast of North America and the east coast of Asia lie, not parallel one to another, but in almost perfect alignment. The Great Circle routes, too, which mark the shortest distance between two points of navigation, must be plotted by curved lines on the Mercator map rather than by straight lines. The shortest distance between California and Yokohama, for example, is not along the 35th parallel, as appears to be the case, but rather by an arc passing close to the Aleutians and Kamchatka. And the most

direct route by air from New York to Chungking is over the North Pole, instead of due west.

POLAR PROJECTION



THE POLAR MAP

In considering, therefore, the relative positions of the land areas of the Northern Hemisphere, the North Polar projection of the world map is preferable. Indeed, it has become almost a necessity for illustrating on a flat surface the impact of aviation upon


the strategic problems of World War II. In addition, one is able to plot more adequately the "around the world" aspect of global war, a distinct advantage, since the principal battle areas lie in the Northern Hemisphere. One can understand more readily, too, why Alaska, Newfoundland and Iceland and certain isolated points in northern Scandinavia and Soviet Siberia are already important centers of air transport.

But useful as the Polar projection is in plotting the air routes and in illustrating the global aspects of the war between the Northern Hemisphere Powers, its limitations can readily be seen. For as one moves in any direction from the central point on which the map is plotted the distortions grow in size. Thus, in the North Polar projection the land and sea areas of the Southern Hemisphere appear even more incongruous than in the old Mercator map.

EQUAL AREA MAPS

A third type of map, one which is especially useful in indicating the topography, resources and transportation systems of the land

EQUAL AREA PROJECTION



areas of the earth, is the projection commonly called "Equal Area." There are many different designs for this map, but most of them have the common principle of splitting the oceans in such a manner as to reduce to a minimum the distortions of the land masses of the globe. Thus Soviet Russia, Alaska and Greenland appear in proper proportion to Europe, the United States or Brazil. But the disadvantages of this map lie in the fact that the world is cut into separate segments and ocean areas distorted to much the same degree as the inaccuracies of the land masses are reduced.

DIFFERENT MAPS FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES

The student of world affairs, therefore, needs to become thoroughly familiar with all three types of maps, understanding in each case the limited degree to which a true picture is presented. Up to the present war, generations of American citizens had never learned to visualize the globe correctly. Whenever they viewed a wall map of the world in their homes, classrooms or public meeting places, it was usually the Mercator projection which they saw. Even more unfortunate, the map with which they became familiar was the one originally designed for Europeans.

It was not until the last decade that American cartographers and educators generally thought of putting into use a world map in which the Eurasian continent is split in such a way as to illustrate the interoceanic position of the Americas with Asia on one side and Europe and Africa on the other. Formerly, America was usually represented as occupying a region apart on the left of the map, with Eurasia and Africa to the right.

One can hardly wonder that the average citizen in this country has failed to understand the world position of the United States, and that we have not as a people even yet become a mature nation

so far as concerns our thinking on matters of foreign policy. Global war alone has forced us to recognize certain geographic realities which, if understood before, might have enabled us to avoid many of the tragedies of the present.

Maps have therefore a very great influence upon the opinions and judgments of the average citizen. This is particularly true when viewed in relation to a few obvious, though frequently forgotten, facts of geography.

NATURAL GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS



2. World Geography

Human relations are profoundly influenced by the impact of land and sea upon mankind. If all regions of the earth were equally endowed with natural resources and favorable climate, the problems of human relations might be greatly simplified. This is a world of extremes, however, in which riches and poverty are on every side and man's unfulfilled desires are without limit.

MODERN FRONTIERS

Today there are no unclaimed lands. The world of unknown frontiers has gone forever. Through the long process of history the earth has become completely divided between peoples of different races and cultures, who live under separate political units known as nation-states. All states differ as to size of territory and population and as to the extent of their endowment in natural resources. The artificial political boundaries between them, moreover, restrict the freedom of their people to come and go about the world as they choose, or to exploit the natural resources of neighboring lands.

But barriers against migration and freedom of trade do not reduce the desirability of the other fellows' territory. This is one of the reasons why the fruits of conquest have always been a lure and justification for war in the never ending struggle for survival and power. Today, each nation possesses what it has, not by divine right, but by virtue of the chances and hazards of historic conquests and events.

The earth's surface is approximately 196 million square miles. Of this 139 million square miles is sea, leaving 57 million square miles of land, or a little over one-fourth of the globe, upon which

over two billion human beings seek their livelihood. There are many peculiarities about the land areas of the earth which account not only for overcrowding in some sections and sparseness of habitation in others, but which also influence profoundly the pattern of present-day international relations.

A NORTHERN HEMISPHERE WORLD

Ours is essentially a Northern Hemisphere world. Eighty-five per cent of the land areas of the earth lie north of the equator. In contrast to those of the Southern Hemisphere, they are richly endowed with the basic essentials of industrial power such as coal, iron, oil and available water power. Geographically, Africa, Australasia, and South America serve as extensions of Eurasia and North America. Their trade is not between themselves, but almost entirely with the populous centers of the Northern Hemisphere. Important as these lands below the equator are to the industrial peoples of the North, their relative poverty in the basic raw materials of heavy industry, and their remoteness from the major centers of world commerce, preclude them from attaining the status of Great Powers.

INHOSPITABLE EARTH REGIONS

The regions of the earth which are capable of supporting large populations by virtue of richness of resources and favorable climate, are distinctly limited. Large areas are closed to extensive human habitation by climatic conditions and poverty of the soil.

Historically the greatest land obstacle to extensive settlement and intercommunication between races of mankind is the vast desert and mountain belt which completely divides southern Africa and Asia from Europe and most of Russia. Beginning with the Sahara, it continues through the deserts of Arabia and Iran to the enormous barren plateaus of Tibet and Mongolia,

ending finally with the mountain wilderness of eastern Siberia. In North America a mountainous belt extending from Alaska and following the Canadian Rockies south through western United States and Mexico is likewise sparsely settled though more easily open to communication.

To these forbidding sections of the earth must be added the lands of ice or tundra of northern Canada, northern Europe and Siberia, as well as of Greenland and Antarctica. Finally, the Australian desert, which comprises over half of that continent, should be included, together with the lofty mountain regions of northern India and western South America.


All told the above inhospitable regions of the earth comprise over 40 per cent of its land surface. In these areas live no more than 35 million people or less than one sixtieth of the world's population.

In an entirely different category from the above, though in many respects equally uninviting to large-scale settlement, are the tropical forest lands of the earth. These comprise the valleys of the Amazon and Congo Rivers, as well as most of the equatorial islands of southeast Asia. While medical science and improved technique in agriculture may eventually make these regions available for considerable settlement, they are at present most uninviting to prospective immigration.

POPULATION CENTERS

The actual or potential centers of world population are therefore strictly limited and comprise less than half the land surface of the earth. In the North Atlantic basin they include Europe with central and southern Russia, together with eastern and central United States and southern Canada. In the North Pacific world they include the islands of Japan and the river valleys of China and India, together with a narrow strip of southern Siberia

DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POPULATION



EACH DOT REPRESENTS 2 MILLION PERSONS

and the western shores of North America. In the Southern Hemisphere only a part of the coastal regions of Australia and South America are open to large-scale settlement, to which may be added considerable territory still available in the plateau areas of east Africa and Brazil.

The major portion of the above areas, with the exception of India and southern China, lie in the temperate zones. They are distinguished by the high degree of energy and progressiveness of their inhabitants due to favorable climatic conditions. It is obvious that where extremes of temperature prevail human energy is severely sapped, either by the mere struggle for survival, as is the case in the far north, or by the debilitating effects of intense heat in the tropics and sub-tropics. It is not surprising, therefore, that the principal centers of world power today have sprung from those regions which provide seasonal climatic changes which are productive of more vigorous and intense human effort.

3. The Geographic Factor

Four basic factors of foreign policy are: the *Geographic*, the *Economic*, the *Demographic*, and the *Strategic*. Of these, the first relates to the location of a nation; the second concerns the land considered from the aspects of raw materials and national economy; the third includes the size, character and density of its population; and the fourth embraces the relation of physical geography and armament capacity to national defense.

It is evident that all four of the above factors are closely inter-related. A nation's resources, which are geographic in nature, will obviously have primary influence upon its economy and the size and character of its population. Similarly, the location and physical geography of a nation's territorial base, together with the character of its population and national economy, will have a direct bearing upon the strategic problems of national defense.

WORLD LOCATION

The first aspect of *geographic position* concerns a nation's *world location* with respect to trade routes and the principal reserves of industrial raw materials. Prosperity and power have always been vitally influenced by shifts in centers of trade and commerce. The discovery of new lands and natural resources, and improvements in the technology of production and transportation, have vitally affected the position of nations.

ATHENS AND ROME AT THE CROSSROADS

During the early Classical Age, whose world was bounded by the Mediterranean regions, Athens enjoyed her day of power by virtue of her location at the crossroads of Asia Minor, Italy and

Egypt. Later it was Rome that rose to dominance aided by her central position in the Mediterranean Sea, which then defined the enlarged limits of the civilized world.


A thousand years after the fall of Rome, following the awakening of Europe from the Middle Ages, a dramatic change in the centers of power took place on the "old continent." The ancient overland routes between Europe and Asia had become closed by the Turkish conquest of the Middle East. The Mediterranean declined in importance, and with it Venice and Genoa, which had inherited some of the ancient prestige of Rome, went into eclipse.

THE CENTERS SHIFT—BRITAIN AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC

In Europe's search for another route to Asia, not only were the Americas discovered, but the sea lanes to the Far East, around Africa and across the Pacific, were opened. For the first time in human history the world was proved to be a globe which could be circled by the ships of trading nations. The principal centers of commerce rapidly shifted to the North Atlantic shores of Europe and particularly to the British Isles, guarding those shores. After the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, Britain's rising sea power achieved for her eventual supremacy which was to survive until the twentieth century, Louis XIV and Napoleon offering the most serious challenge.

Since the beginning of modern history the seats of government of all the Great Powers had been centered in Europe. The European system of sovereign independent states and the European concepts of the laws of war and peace had become generally accepted, as former colonial areas won their independence and Asiatic peoples their nationhood. No state in the other regions of the world had arisen seriously to threaten the supremacy of Europe or to challenge its balance-of-power system.

"THE WORLD THAT MATTERS"



COAL, IRON, AND WORLD LOCATION

With the rise of modern industrialization, the factor of geographic position took on a new significance. Thenceforth the *world* location of a nation had importance, not only with respect to the centers of trade, but likewise to the existing reserves of the two basic raw materials of industry, coal and iron. From the point of view of power politics the principal centers of industrialization as well as of trade constituted "the world that matters."

Fortunately for the Powers of Europe there existed considerable reserves of coal and iron in the British Isles, on the borderlands of France and Germany, and in the Russian Ukraine and Ural regions. But even richer reserves were located in the United States. In addition, deposits in Japan and northeast China, while limited in extent, could provide for the development of industries in that area of the world, a circumstance the Japanese were not slow to seize upon at the expense of their Chinese neighbor and the Western nations.

A NEW INDUSTRIAL POWER—THE U. S. A.

It was America's victory over Spain in 1898 and the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905, which first gave notice to the Powers of Europe that the end of an era had indeed come. During the next four decades the United States not only surpassed every other nation in industrial might, but soon equaled all the other Powers combined. America at last had the means to make good her defense of the Monroe Doctrine against all comers and without benefit of British benevolence. Of even greater importance, her decisions on policy henceforth could tip the scales of any conflict which might arise between the Powers in Europe or the Orient.

JAPAN

In the Far East, the Japanese position was likewise striking. While potentially the natural resources of China were infinitely greater than those of Japan, they remained virtually undeveloped. Scarcely half a century after her doors had been opened to the West, Japan had utilized the natural resources at hand for the creation of basic industries of sufficient size to support a fleet equal to defending her claim of paramount position in the Far East. In this regard she was greatly aided, too, by the continued internal weakness of China, the isolationist policies of the United States, and the acute concern of the nations of Europe over events in their own region of the world.

THE BALANCE OF POWER CHANGES

Thus in the twentieth century international relations ceased to function along the relatively simple lines of the era of European dominance. Instead, two new Powers, Japan in Asia and the United States in America, had arisen to redress the balance of the old. The greatest of the industrial Powers lay not in Europe or Asia but in America.

The factor of *world location*, therefore, in so far as it concerns the situation of a nation with respect to "the world that matters," has assumed a new significance. And the geographic position of the United States in relation to Europe, Asia and Latin America strikingly recalls, in the contemporary world, that of ancient Rome within the more restricted confines of the Mediterranean basin.

REGIONAL LOCATION

The *regional* location of a nation refers to the particular continent or island area in which the territorial base and seat of the government is located. The importance of the regional position

EUROPE-1934



of any nation lies in the fact that the political, economic, and strategic circumstances of each continent or island area differ widely. It is natural, for instance, that a nation whose territorial base is located in Europe, will face problems of foreign relations with its neighbors quite at variance with those of an Asiatic or an American nation. The very words "Europe," "Far East,"

"America," and "Africa" bring to one's mind a different political atmosphere or set of relationships.

EUROPE AND ASIA

There is no place in the world where traditions of rivalry and warfare have left as deep an imprint as in Europe. Historic hatreds, racial conflicts and cultural differences contribute as much to continued economic and political disunity as do the many artificial political boundaries between the numerous states of that unhappy continent. The fact too, that five of the seven Great Powers are located within its restricted confines has hardly served to reduce the causes of tension.

A different though equally unstable situation arises in Asia. Here not five but one Great Power, the island empire of Japan, has its territorial base and seat of government. In place of many independent states as in Europe the undefinable land mass of China with its teeming millions and inadequate economic and political organization has occupied the central Asiatic mainland. To the north lie the relatively undeveloped wastes of Siberia and to the south were the weakly held colonial lands of the Western Powers. The whole has long been the cause of a dangerous political vacuum into which some strong aggressive power might rush—a condition the Japanese proceeded to exploit.

It is only during the past twenty years that the great Chinese people have commenced to recover from the disintegrating effects of the impact of the West and have become conscious of the responsibilities of modern statehood. This recent rise of Chinese nationalism, itself stirred in part by fear of Japan, has given the militarists of Japan a persuasive argument for domestic support of their aggressive designs. The Japanese have long feared, not only the predatory ambitions of the West, but also the possible menace to themselves of an awakened and united China. For just as the prospect of a unified Europe, whether

under Spanish, French, German or other auspices has always been viewed with alarm by the island nation of Great Britain, so is a strong united China dreaded by the island nation of Japan. Under the guise of "Asia for Asiatics," and because of an undoubted and long-standing resentment of the yellow peoples towards the dominant white, the Japanese have sought to put the West out of the Far East. At the same time their real design has been to cripple the rising power of China through conquest and division of her vast continental domain into smaller and more easily controlled units.

RETREAT OF THE WEST

Historically, of course, the European balance-of-power system has frequently manifested itself in Asia, through the imperialist rivalries of the Western nations. But the emergence of Japan as a Great Power and the recognition of her naval dominance in that area of the world by the Washington Treaties of 1922, were a signal of at least a temporary retreat of the West.

Up to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China in 1940 all the lands of southern Asia still remained under the sovereign control of the West, save the kingdom of Thai. But the rapidity of Japanese success in her recent conquests, which has encompassed all but India, Siberia and a part of China, gave eloquent testimony to the weakness of Western control in these areas.

It is evident, therefore, that the regional circumstances of the Far East are very different from those of Europe. Nor can any nation in the Orient escape the fact that its location in that area of the world is a basic factor of its foreign policy, no matter what the outcome of the present war.

AUSTRALASIA AND AFRICA

Two other regions of the globe, Australasia and Africa, present conditions peculiar to colonial traditions. The major portion of these lands border the Indian Ocean on the east and west with

India itself at the northern apex. The only sovereign independent states in either of these regions are the British Dominions, New Zealand, Australia and the Union of South Africa. Egypt and Ethiopia, it is true, enjoy nominal independence and Southern Rhodesia and India have attained the status of semi-Dominions. These fall, however, within the British orbit of control, as does Liberia within the American.

The other areas of Africa belong strictly to Europe's colonial domains, of which Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain are the holders. The inhabitants have no power of decision in foreign relations, these matters being left entirely to the ruling country. Nor has any feeling of nationalism developed among the natives likely soon to give rise to claims for sovereign independence. Nevertheless, colonies as such are coming more and more to be viewed as trusts, to be administered for the benefit of the natives, with equal opportunities for trade and commerce open to all nations.

Australasia comprises the two white British Dominions, Australia and New Zealand, and the vast area of tropical islands lying along the equator for nearly four thousand miles, which include the Dutch East Indies and scattered British possessions. In none of these tropical isles, with the possible exception of Java, has native nationalism evolved to the point of being capable of self-government. This does not include the Philippines, however, whose situation in this respect is unique. Their independence, promised by the United States in 1946, will follow their reconquest from Japan.

This vast island region of the South Pacific offers an unusual combination of circumstances. Its peoples include the most primitive as well as the most civilized. Their political status ranges from the most absolutist type of colonial rule to that of sovereign independence. Lacking any real sense of regional unity, they are

divided in their loyalties and constantly subject to the conflicting pressures of power politics of Asia, Europe and America.

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The fifth and last region of the world, the Western Hemisphere, presents some striking contrasts to the other four. All the nations of the Americas are of colonial origin, but unlike most of Africa, Australasia and India, they have long been emancipated and free. While the twenty republics south of the Rio Grande stem from the Latin tradition as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon traditions of the United States and Canada, all profit from the common experience of having won the frontiers of a vast, unexplored world.

As in Asia, there is only one Great Power in the Western Hemisphere. Economically the United States has very much the same concern over relations with its neighbors as do the nations of Europe and the Far East. But the relative absence of territorial disputes and national rivalries within the Western Hemisphere serve to simplify our regional political problems. Despite certain inevitable suspicions and jealousies, the historic policy of the United States to exclude from the Americas the rivalries of the other Great Powers has helped to produce an atmosphere of "live and let live" which is unique in the world.

REGIONAL LOCATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

All five of the principal regions of the earth differ, obviously, one from the other. As a result, the world outlook and international policies of each are frequently at variance. The regional concerns of the Great Powers of Europe and Asia assume paramount importance and severely restrict thereby their field of action elsewhere. The United States, by contrast, having no neighbors strong enough to challenge its position, is assured at all times the security of its home frontiers. This has given us the

advantage of being able to shift with impunity from the position of detachment in the affairs of nations outside the Western Hemisphere to a policy of decisive intervention without fear of attack at home.

Regional location has, therefore, a profound influence on foreign policy. It is one of the basic reasons in fact why the nations of a globe, which has become "one world," economically and technologically, remain politically and regionally divided. For the world outlook of each region is dissimilar to that of the others, and the foreign policies of the nations of each are bound to differ accordingly. Americans can no more think in European or Asiatic terms than can the Japanese in American. All plans for a new world order or universal association for peace must remain subject to the limiting circumstance that the regional concerns of nations will have first importance whether they conflict with world interests or not.

INTERREGIONAL LOCATION

The third aspect of geographic location, *interregional position*, is limited primarily to the small number of nations which have colonial possessions in areas other than that of their territorial base, or whose economic, commercial and military power is so great as to impinge directly upon nations all over the globe.

Of the colonial Powers, Britain and France possess territories in all five regions: European, American, Asiatic, Australasian and African. Russia extends into two regions of the world, and the United States also belongs to the two-region group through her Philippine interests in Asia. The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Norway and Denmark, though small states, are likewise directly involved in the relations of other regions of the world by virtue of important colonial holdings. But in the case of all colonial states, it is the security of the homeland as opposed to

outlying possessions which must receive primary consideration in matters of defense. This is true even of Great Britain and France, whose overseas possessions greatly exceed in area the territory of the mother country.

AMERICA'S POSITION


The contrast of the American position in these aspects of inter-regional concern is most striking. Our location in the Western Hemisphere offers few of the complications discoverable in other parts of the world. In the middle thirties, we even thought it possible to abdicate from the strategic worries of the Philippines by the promise of independence, as a means of avoiding involvement in "other peoples' wars." The very fact that we were the world's greatest industrial Power, protected by vast stretches of ocean, gave us a false sense of security.

Although America's geographic circumstances have made possible our remaining generally aloof from the affairs of other regions, no other nation can ignore the implications of American policy. The impact of our power, though it may arise from purely domestic or regional considerations, is so enormous as to have repercussions throughout the globe. The very fact that American troops, ships and planes are to be found today in every area of the world is as much an indication of the extraordinary nature of our interregional position in the future peace as it is in the present war.

It is evident, therefore, that a nation's *geographic* position, whether regional, interregional or world, serves as a basic factor of foreign policy. Its full significance, however, can only be appreciated when viewed with respect to economic, demographic and strategic circumstances.

ESSENTIALS OF POWER

PRE-WAR SITUATION



EACH BAR SHOWS TOTAL PRE-WAR CONSUMPTION OF 7 POWERS
 BLACK AREAS = PORTION NORMALLY MET BY DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
 SHADED AREAS = PORTION NORMALLY MET BY IMPORTS

4. The Economic Factor

The second of the basic factors of foreign policy is the *economic*, considered from the aspects of raw materials, and national economy. The important bearing which the disparity among nations in food resources and the essential raw materials of industry has upon their peace and war relations is now generally recognized. World War I served to draw more strongly the lines of distinction, not only between the inheritors of the major portion of the world's natural wealth and the disinherited, but between the inheritors themselves. Nor were the so-called "Have-not" Powers slow in utilizing the propaganda value of their relative poverty in raw materials as a supposed justification for their aggressive designs against the "Haves."

The power of a nation is not measured alone by the extent of its territory and the size of its population, or even by the wealth of its treasuries and the size of its armies. In the long run it is determined by its capacity for industrialized warfare. Since large-scale industrialization presupposes the possession or ready availability of sufficient quantities of the basic raw materials, their unequal distribution has set a rigid limit in the number of states capable of achieving the status of Great Powers.

AGRARIAN NATIONS

Broadly speaking, states are divided into three groups, *agrarian*, *industrial* and *balanced*. To the first group belong those nations which produce foodstuffs and certain raw materials but which cannot become highly industrialized through lack of large resources of the basic essentials, coal and iron. Even water power will not provide for other than secondary industries.

All states in South America belong to this group, though the rich iron resources of Brazil offer the possibility of a considerable steel industry despite the necessity of importing coal. The nations and peoples of the Far East, with the exception of the Japanese, are likewise agrarian. The potentialities for industrialization in China and India are, however, great. Most of the small states of Europe are also primarily producers of foodstuffs.

INDUSTRIAL NATIONS

To the second, or *industrial* group of nations belong those which have been able to develop both heavy and light industries by virtue of the possession of coal and iron or the ready availability of these resources from their immediate neighbors. While few in number, they are largely dependent upon foreign sources for many essential raw materials, and are frequently incapable of producing sufficient foodstuffs for home consumption because of their large populations and limited home territory. Of the former and present Great Powers, France, Germany, the British Isles, Italy and Japan belong to this group. Among the lesser states may be cited Belgium, Poland, Luxemburg, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Canada and Australia.

"BALANCED" NATIONS

The last or *balanced* group of nations includes the United States, the British Empire and the Soviet Union. France, before her defeat, could aspire to a secondary rank within this category of states by virtue of her empire. Similarly Japan and Germany, thanks to their present conquests, have achieved a temporary status as members of this group. But the resources of Europe are too limited to give the Nazis any permanent hope of self-sufficiency, even for the duration of the war, and the Japanese are too involved in the defense of their widely scattered conquests

to be able to exploit their newly won resources on the necessary scale.

RAW MATERIALS AND THE GREAT POWERS

The economies of states differ widely, therefore, both as to the size and character of national production. Their capacity for war has become largely a question of machine power. It is obvious, too, that even the great industrial nations are unequal in their war and peace potentials because of a diversity in the extent of their raw material wealth.


While the defeat of the Axis will result in the emergence of only three World Powers, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States, eventually Germany, Japan and France may restore themselves to Great Power rank. The outlook of Italy in this respect, on the contrary, is as dark as that of China and India is potentially bright. For unlike the latter two nations, which have considerable though relatively unexploited reserves of the essentials of industrialization, Italy must always remain dependent upon her neighbors.

GERMANY

The fact that World War II will produce such a momentous change in the balance of power justifies an examination of the raw material position of the great industrial nations at the start of the armament race in 1934. A study of the accompanying chart reveals that the United States, the British Empire and the Soviet Union were the only Great Powers with a relative degree of self-sufficiency. Of the twenty-two great essential raw materials, Germany was either largely or entirely dependent upon foreign sources for all items except coal, nitrates and potash. Her apparent self-sufficiency in iron was based upon the probable availability of Swedish supplies which could be supplemented

ESSENTIAL MATERIALS

ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF 1934 FIGURES



↑ CONSUMPTION
 ↓ DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
 + EXPORTABLE SURPLUS
 + NECESSARY IMPORTS (MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE DURING WAR),
 AVAILABLE FROM COLONIES OR REGIONS OF CONTROL,
 AND INCREASED DOMESTIC PRODUCTION



by a lightning conquest of the Lorraine deposits in France and the minor deposits of central and eastern Europe.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The situation of the British was of special interest. The British Isles themselves were self-sufficient only in coal and artificial nitrates and, to a large degree in iron. With these three exceptions Britain was forced to import virtually all of the essentials of industrialization and a considerable portion of her food supplies. Fortunately for her these were available in ample quantities in outlying parts of the Empire or were assumed to be available from friendly nations such as France and the United States in case of war.

India was the world's richest source of manganese and mica, as were Rhodesia of chromite and copper and the Malay States of rubber and tin. Canada, moreover, produced 95 per cent of the world's supply of nickel; and virtually every other essential commodity with the exception of potash, antimony and mercury was to be found in sufficient quantities in other parts of the Empire or within regions under British control. So long, therefore, as Britain could maintain a bridge of ships in time of war as well as during peace, her raw material situation was sound.

ITALY AND JAPAN

Italy, on the other hand, was almost entirely dependent upon foreign sources of coal and iron. The only minerals she possessed in ample quantities were zinc and mercury, though low-grade domestic deposits of lead and bauxite for aluminum could be further exploited and her nitrate industry expanded. The one important endowment of Italian industry was an ample supply of water power.

The Japanese position was only slightly better, thanks to her modest resources in coal and iron. These in turn were supplied

mented by Manchurian supplies. Her domestic reserves of sulphur, chromite, tungsten, nitrates and mica were likewise sufficient to cover minimum needs. But with these exceptions, all the remaining raw material essentials had to be imported in entirety or in considerable amounts. With the virtual doubling of her steel capacity from one and one-half million to three million tons a year between 1929 and 1935, Japan's dependence upon foreign alloy metals proportionately increased.

FRANCE

The strength of France is obviously dependent upon her empire. Being entirely self-sufficient only in iron, aluminum and potash, with even her coal resources inadequate for war emergency, imports of most items were necessary to the maintenance of her industries. From her colonial possessions she could draw on nickel, chromite, antimony and mica. For the rest, France had to depend largely upon the empires of Britain and Holland, a circumstance at all times subject to British friendship and control of the seas.

THE SOVIET UNION

On the evidence at hand in 1934, the Soviet Union apparently lacked only five essentials: rubber, nickel, tungsten, antimony and tin. While certain of the remaining items were at that time being imported from abroad, their incidence in exploitable quantities, particularly in Siberia, gave promise of self-sufficiency in time of war. Little did the world know or even rightly guess to what extent the Russians were preparing themselves industrially for such an eventuality.

THE UNITED STATES

The contrast between the position of the United States and that of the other Great Powers was both striking and significant.

Provided we could maintain the security of our territorial waters as well as the west coast of South America and the north coast of Brazil, only four items of consequence were unavailable in sufficient quantities within the Western Hemisphere. Of these rubber was the most important, though synthetic production was always a possibility. For tin and antimony there would likewise be substitutes for civilian use, leaving sufficient supplies for military needs. While the chromium situation might become tight, enough was procurable for indispensable armament needs.

STEEL CAPACITY


These considerations so far as America was concerned rested upon the assumption, however, that our steel capacity, the basis of all arms production, would not exceed 60 million tons a year, a figure in any event 20 per cent higher than we had ever achieved. Today we are producing steel at the rate of 92 million tons per year, which may very well reach a rate of 100 million tons by the close of the war! Yet, despite this emergency, the raw material front is holding its own. The pooling of all allied resources and the fact that the other nations of the Western Hemisphere can provide most of the resources we lack has enabled the United States to meet a situation which exceeds all previous calculations as to needs.

To the world of 1934 it had appeared that the virtual raw material monopoly of the British Empire and the United States, supplemented by the French and Dutch Colonial domains, assured to the democratic Powers a position of unchallengeable security. For it was clearly assumed that no nation could fight a war without vast quantities of raw materials, and it was evident that only the democratic Powers controlled the major sources of supply.

Another reason for deceptive satisfaction lay in the fact that

the apparent combined industrial capacities of the aggressor states was inferior to that of the democratic nations. Even Russia, whose policies remained obscure, gave the impression of a nation under-industrialized in terms of her available raw material wealth. In the period 1929-1930, which marked a high point in output up to that time, the steel production of the major Powers stood as shown in the accompanying chart.

GREAT POWERS — STEEL CAPACITY



These comparisons in steel output were reflected in the comparative size in production and consumption of the other essential raw materials by the same industrial Powers. Here again the outstanding position of the United States was clearly indicated. Our consumption of most items equaled the total of the other nations combined.

"GUNS WITHOUT BUTTER"

Between 1934 and 1939, however, a veil of mystery descended upon the world's raw material trade. While Germany, Italy and

Japan were undoubtedly poor in natural resources, no effective barrier was placed against their purchasing supplies abroad greatly in excess of peacetime needs, provided they had the foreign exchange. Their policy of "guns instead of butter" was for the purpose of making available the exchange with which to accumulate stock piles for war. Thus, while the democracies slept, the impossible happened. Germany and her two Axis partners, Japan and Italy, emerged with a military and naval power so formidable that they nearly achieved their design for world conquest.

THE UNITED NATIONS MOBILIZE THEIR RESOURCES

But what is of importance today is the fact that, having survived the first onslaughts of the Axis, the vast and newly mobilized resources of the United Nations are beginning to tell. Already the Nazi industrial plant in Germany and conquered Europe is being whittled down both by a scarcity of essential raw materials and by bombing from the air. It is estimated that the industrial capacity of Europe has even now been reduced by something between 25 and 35 per cent through the above means. At the point of surrender it is highly probable that more than half of Germany's industrial plants will be lying in ruins, and the same can be said for Japan and Italy.

The exact figures of the present steel capacities of the warring nations are not in all cases available, but the conservative estimates indicated in the "Steel Capacity" chart can be made, allowing for probable destruction to date from bombing of plants in Europe. It is impossible to determine exactly how much destruction will be brought upon the industrial plants of the Axis nations by their defeat. The post-war estimate of annual steel capacity shown in the chart is based on the assumption that half of their industry will have been destroyed.

AFTER THE WAR, WHAT?

It is apparent that ours will remain a Great Power World, though instead of seven only three will emerge from the present conflict with their strength relatively undiminished. The situation in the Americas will not have greatly changed as far as the dominant position of the United States is concerned. Europe on the other hand will have become a vacuum in the sense that no strictly European power will be in a position to maintain order. Germany and Italy will be prostrate, and France severely shaken. The burden of restoring peace will therefore fall primarily upon Great Britain and Soviet Russia, aided by the United States.

In Asia, the situation may prove even more precarious. China, though endowed with the natural resources essential to large-scale industrial development, will be a long time attaining a Great Power status in this modern sense. Japan will be fully as prostrate as Germany and Italy, with her dream of Empire completely smashed. The only hope of reconstruction in the Orient, therefore, will lie in the benevolence of Britain, Russia and the United States. Whether or not all three meet in that region of the world as allies in war, they must remain there for a time as partners in peace if stability and order are to be realized.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOR PEACE

The mere defeat of the aggressor nations, therefore, is not in itself a solution of the problem of peace. Although conquered and their economies broken, they must still be allowed the means of livelihood. Economically the world is one, and the products of any part of it are essential to the health and prosperity of the whole.

At the close of the present war the peoples of the defeated nations as well as the victorious will still be faced with the

problems peculiar to their own national economies. To deprive Italy, Germany and Japan of the privilege of reconstructing their industrial life on the basis of their natural wealth in raw materials and their trained technicians, would be to force them to starve. No people will accept the alternative of starvation if any means of escape lies within their power.

Such are the implications of the *economic factors* of foreign policy. They determine in large part whether the national policy of a state will be static or dynamic. Their effects, moreover, upon world relationships can be ignored only at peril to peace itself.

5. The Demographic Factor

The third basic factor of foreign policy is the *demographic*, which relates primarily to the size and character of the population of a state. To be a Great Power a nation must have a relatively large population in addition to a high degree of industrial development. Here again the situation of the Powers varies greatly.

France and Italy at the outbreak of the war, for example, each contained about 42 million inhabitants. But the position of France was stronger as a Great Power by virtue of her larger industrial war potential. Brazil and China, with 40 million and 450 million inhabitants respectively, did not rank as Great Powers because of their lack of heavy industries. Again the Soviet Union, with about 40 million more inhabitants than the United States, and nearly as richly endowed in raw materials, was industrially inferior.

WEAKNESS THROUGH COLONIES

Another implication of the size of population is noteworthy. In the British Empire, which has a total of 450 million inhabitants, it is the 45 million people of the United Kingdom supplemented by 25 million white inhabitants in the Dominions, who provide the real sinews of power. The fact that the peoples of the Empire are scattered in all parts of the globe is a cause of weakness, however, arising not only from conflicting interests, but from strategical difficulties in the matter of defense.

In contrast, continental United States and the Soviet Union are able to function with complete unity and to concentrate their power much more effectively than can the British Empire or

could the Republic of France, with their scattered colonial domains. The future of China and India in this respect, also, cannot be ignored. For if these two great continental peoples, with their huge populations, can achieve both unity and industrialization, they will have created the basis of tremendous power.

Thus it is apparent that, while colonies can enhance considerably the total strength of a nation, through additions to its population and reserves of natural resources, they can likewise be the cause of weakness both as to unity of effort and effective defense. Until the actual outbreak of war the British Dominions have never assumed their just share in the burdens of defense of the Empire. The fact that they are geographically so scattered has increased the political particularism of each in time of peace as it has complicated their defense in war.

It is concentrated national power, which in the long run will have the greatest advantage, provided it is based on a large population and a rich and extensive territory. The situation of the United States in this respect is of course outstanding.

POPULATION PRESSURE


Another important aspect of the size of a nation's population is the problem of population pressure upon the means of livelihood. A distinction has to be made, naturally, between population pressure which is recognized and therefore resented and that pressure which, though real, is not recognized. Italy, Germany and Japan have long been conscious of the fact that the wealth of their limited territories was by no means commensurate with the increasing size of their populations. While industrialization offered a form of escape from the growing degree of population pressure and a means whereby the standard of living could be raised, the struggle seemed hard and the circumstances limiting upon their ambitions as Great Powers.

PER CAPITA LIVING SPACE IN 1938


ARABLE LANDS

NON-ARABLE LANDS
(FORESTS, MOUNTAINS, DESERTS, TUNDRAS, ETC.)

SOVIET UNION



UNITED STATES



FRANCE

(EMPIRE EXCL.)



ITALY



GERMANY



GREAT BRITAIN

(EMPIRE EXCL.)



JAPAN



In the overcrowded river valleys of China and India and on the island of Java, on the other hand, the pressure upon the subsistence level has been infinitely greater. But not until recently has the consciousness of such pressure commenced to give rise to the demand for some solution.


The density and the rate of increase of the population must therefore produce a profound influence upon the policies of states. Peoples subjected to severe pressure will seek some means of escape either through migration, agricultural improvement, industrialization or conquest. This is true whether population pressure operates in small or large states. The only difference lies in the fact that the weakness of smaller countries deprives them of the possibility of aggressive solutions unless backed by some powerful ally.

WAR, PEACE, AND "BREATHING SPACE"

One of the most convincing arguments used by the aggressor nations in justification of expansionist ambitions has been the necessity for "breathing space." The enormous territorial holdings of the "Have" Powers as compared with the limited land space of the "Have-not" Powers, were constantly paraded before their people by the leaders of the Axis nations.

Before the outbreak of the present war, the population per square mile of arable land in Japan stood at 2,430, in Germany at 587, and in Italy at 500, contrasted with the Russian figure of 68 and that of the United States at 102. The density of population in Great Britain, while slightly higher than in Germany, could not be said to be the cause of insufferable population pressure since a vast colonial empire provided an area for free migration and an important means for support. In contrast the Japanese Islands, having an area equal to that of California, with scarcely half the arable land, have been maintaining a population of 70 million.

THE POSSESSIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS IN 1938



Yet historically migration and conquest have never proved to be a permanent means of alleviating conditions of population pressure. It is rather natural causes, such as famine and disease, or in the modern times the development of industries which have served to bring land and people into better balance. In the twenty years which marked the colonial expansion of Japan, no more than the equivalent of the birthrate of a single year migrated to Manchuria or to other colonial possessions. Similarly during recent years, more Dutch nationals had returned to overcrowded Holland than took up residence in the Colonies abroad.

But the existence of misery and privation in any region of the world, whether it affects a Great Power or a small nation, is bound to produce disruptions and general discontents which can lead eventually to explosive movements. The world will no longer tolerate unnecessary barriers being placed against the peaceful and freer migration of peoples to many of the underpopulated and unexploited regions of the earth.

ETHNIC PROBLEMS

A third aspect of the *demographic factor* concerns the ethnic character of the population of a nation. This applies particularly to situations where the presence within a state of minority groups of different race, language or culture from the majority of the inhabitants, gives rise to domestic or international conflicts.

The contrast between Europe and other parts of the world is both striking and important. The problem of national minorities in the "old continent" has been one of the major causes of unrest and war. In central and eastern Europe particularly, the complicated minority problems seem almost beyond solution. The several nationalities of this area are so inextricably intermingled that it is impossible to draw political frontiers without somewhere creating a minorities question. This is a situation

which has given rise from time to time to such aroused passions and discontents as to override all possibility of a satisfactory solution of other more important economic and political matters.

SCATTERED GERMAN MINORITIES


Before the present war the largest ethnic minorities in Europe were German. They numbered about 10 millions of German-speaking people, inhabiting parts of the old Austrian Empire as well as Poland, the Baltic States, Rumania, France, Switzerland and even Russia. While in many respects the creation of the German minorities problem was in part at least due to the political arrangements of the Peace Treaties in 1919, its roots go back much further in history than that, both to ancient migrations of German-speaking people and to former conquests.

Thanks to the German minorities, the Nazis have been given a potent weapon for justification in the eyes of their people of expansionist and irredentist ambitions. The annexation of The Saar, of Austria and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia were all preceded by violent agitation of the natural right of these German speaking peoples to become a part of the Fatherland. The invasion of Poland, in September, 1939, was preceded by years of propaganda and a "War of Nerves" over the "cruelty" of treatment by the Poles of their German minorities and the unnatural severing of East Prussia from Germany by the Polish Corridor.

OTHER EUROPEAN MINORITIES

But the Germans have not been the only instigators of trouble over minority questions. The Peace Settlements at the close of World War I likewise placed considerable groups of Hungarians under Czech, Rumanian and Yugoslav sovereignty. In similar fashion the Bulgarians of Macedonia were forced under Greek

THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE



1. SCANDINAVIANS (DANES & SWEDES) 2. DUTCH 3. FRENCH 4. GERMANS
5. ITALIANS 6. LETTS 7. LITHUANIANS 8. EAST SLAVS 9. POLES 10. CZECHS
11. MAGYARS 12. RUMANIANS 13. SLOVENES 14. SERBS AND CROATS
15. BULGARIANS 16. MACEDONIANS 17. ALBANIANS 18. GREEKS 19. TURKS

and Serbian rule and others under Rumanian control in the Dobruja. Hungary and Bulgaria have never ceased to cry out against the loss of considerable numbers of their respective peoples to other national groups. This was one of the strongest

factors in creating a basis for their alliance with Nazi Germany.

It is apparent, therefore, that within Europe itself the drawing of frontiers upon purely linguistic and ethnic lines is an impossibility. But it is likewise true that peoples of different cultural origin can and do exist peacefully together under a single sovereignty.

For many generations German, French and Italian speaking peoples have lived in perfect amity in the Republic of Switzerland. Similarly the Flemings and the Walloons of Belgium learned to settle down to common national life. Nevertheless, despite these and other minor exceptions, the presence of strong minorities within the frontiers of a European state, particularly if they become the cause of irredentist agitation by the nation from which they originated, have served as real obstacles both to political unity and peace.

SOLUTIONS OUTSIDE EUROPE

Minorities problems also exist outside Europe, though they have not become a cause for serious disunity and conflict. Such bilingual countries as the Union of South Africa and the Dominion of Canada have worked out a compromise for what otherwise might have become an impossible situation. The outstanding examples, however, of the successful handling of the minorities problem are seen in Soviet Russia and the Americas.

Ever since the fall of the Czar, Russia has done everything possible to encourage the survival and use of the languages, dialects and cultures of the different racial groups within that enormous country. While the Russian language is still the most universally used, and is official for the Union, it is not imposed upon other linguistic groups. The undivided loyalty of all

peoples of the Soviet Union has been magnificently demonstrated by their common sacrifices in the present war.

In the Americas the minorities problem has been somewhat differently treated. The republics of the Western Hemisphere have always gone on the assumption that those who came to colonize or settle came by choice and should therefore accept the life and customs which they found in their new country. If they did not choose to learn the national tongue, it was not forced upon them, but the schools to which their children went conducted their classes in only one language. By the second or third generation all cultural distinctions have tended to fade and the millions of European immigrants to the Western Hemisphere have in general taken on a full life as Americans.

It is apparent, therefore, that the ethnic factor of linguistic nationalism assumes greater or less importance in the national and foreign policies of states according to the local or regional situation. While in Europe the minorities problem can be a cause for international war, in the Americas it is hardly more than a domestic circumstance.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF RACIAL PROBLEMS

Closely related to the problem of linguistic nationalism is the question of race. There are no states in the world in which the ruling classes are predominately black, with the exception of Liberia, Haiti and Ethiopia. It is largely between the yellow, brown and white races that jealousies and conflict assume international importance.

Much of the support which the Japanese militarists have received in their conquest of Asiatic lands, both at home and abroad, has been due to the dislike and hatreds of many of the yellow and brown peoples toward the white. Ever since contact

between the Orient and Europe was made, the Eastern peoples have been treated as inferiors in many instances by the Western nations. From the Japanese point of view one of the major causes of resentment was the insult to their racial pride, delivered by the American Exclusion Act of 1924. The Chinese and Indian peoples likewise shared these sentiments though they were not in a position to make their feelings a cause for aggressive action.

It is in this respect that the racial problem from a purely domestic aspect may assume international importance. The exclusion of the Orientals from the United States and British Dominions has been based much less on a feeling of natural dislike than the fear of economic competition with a people of much lower standard of living. An added reason has been the desire to avoid racial mixtures. But the results have been a constant cause for irritation and a detriment to good relations.

The Negro problem in America is not without possible international implications, although a domestic issue from the American point of view. It is difficult to reconcile our widely proclaimed war aim of the equality and complete freedom of peoples in other parts of the world with its partial denial to certain groups within this country. The whole question of racial equality as it has been presented by the propaganda of Oriental peoples as well as by the Soviet Union has not fallen on deaf ears among the American Negroes.

It is clear, therefore, that the demographic factor has important significance in contemporary world relations. The size of the population of a nation and the technical skill of its people will influence its ability to play an important role in world affairs. Similarly a nation's ethnic make-up and the degree to which it is faced with a real or imaginary racial and minorities problem, will have a direct bearing upon its domestic and foreign policies.

6. The Strategic Factor


The preceding pages have defined the importance of geographic position, of types of national economy and the size and character of population as basic factors of foreign policy. It is evident, too, that the degree of industrial development and wealth in natural resources will have a direct bearing upon a nation's war potential. There remains for consideration the fourth, or *strategic* factor, which has to do with the offensive and defensive potentialities of a state's position.

From the strategic standpoint the important characteristics of the physical geography of a nation are the nature of its boundaries, whether sea or land, and the presence or absence of natural protective barriers. In addition the size of the territory and the distance from potential enemies are important related features. In all respects, however, the overriding consideration is a nation's armaments capacity.

Broadly speaking there are two types of land and sea positions, distinguishable as to the insular or continental nature of the territory of a state. An island country would naturally depend primarily upon a navy and air force as the first line of defense, whereas in the case of a continental nation an army with accompanying air force would have first importance.

ISLAND COUNTRIES

Great Britain, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Cuba and Iceland offer the principal examples of island position. While all have the common strategic circumstance of danger of attack from the sea alone, none but the British and Japanese are capable of maintaining navies of



sufficient strength to ward off a strong enemy fleet. As Great Powers, too, Britain and Japan face a similar strategic problem, inasmuch as the island base of each lies close to a vast and potentially hostile continent. A united and strong China or the reinforcement of Russian power in Siberia could conceivably be as much of a threat to the Japanese as continental Europe united in a hostile bloc could be to the British.

CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES

The continental types of states are of course much more numerous than those belonging to the island group. They are to be distinguished by the land and sea ratios of their boundaries. Of these the most extreme example is that of the *landlocked* nation, which has no direct access to the sea except through the territory of its neighbors. To this group belong Austria, Czechoslovakia and Luxemburg, before their annexation to Germany, as well as Switzerland, Hungary, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ethiopia, Tibet



and Afghanistan. Poland, too, before the war, would have been considered landlocked had it not been for the corridor to Danzig created in eastern Pomerania.

Of the nations of the world having both land and sea frontiers there are three broad classifications. The first includes such countries as Germany, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Belgium, the greater portion of whose boundaries were land as opposed to sea. The second, or *peninsular* group, includes Italy, Greece, Spain, the Scandinavian countries and India. To the





third, or *balanced* group, belong the United States, Canada, the coastal nations of Latin America, the Netherlands, Soviet Russia and China. Among the above, the situation of the Great Powers, together with that of Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia, presents certain unusual strategic problems by virtue of the fact that these countries face two or more inland seas or oceans. The sea frontiers of Russia and Canada, however, are predominantly icebound.

AN OUTLET TO THE SEA

It is quite obvious that free access to the open ocean can have great strategic significance with respect to blockade in war. *Landlocked* states will naturally be at the mercy of their neighbors, as will those nations having only indirect means of outlet to the ocean highways. In this latter category Russia is again an outstanding example, since her principal outlets are by the Baltic and the Black Seas on the West and the Japan Sea on the East. Italy likewise has always had a sense of frustration

because the British Navy controls the exits from the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and Suez. A less restricted, though strategically difficult problem, has been faced by Germany, due to the fact that her freedom of passage into the Atlantic is obstructed by the proximity of the British Isles.

PROBLEMS OF COLONIAL DEFENSE

The last, and in many respects a more complicated, land and sea situation is typified by a combination of insular and continental positions. This applies particularly to the colonial nations and



may be described broadly as the *disconnected* type. The relative ease with which parts of the colonial holdings and dependencies of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States have succumbed to attack in the present war is indicative of the difficulties of defending widely scattered areas under a single sovereignty. Nor does the future offer any permanent hope for guaranteeing the security of dependencies without an adequate system of mutual defense as between the colonial nations themselves or a world order with effective international police powers.

NATURAL BARRIERS

Another aspect of the *strategic* factor concerns the physical geography of a nation as to natural defensive barriers. While there exists today virtually no barrier against attack from the air, except for that of distance or climate, the topography of the land and the nature of the seas can greatly influence the ease of movements of ships and men.

Historically, the most effective barriers against attack have been the ice-bound sea and land areas of the earth. The North Polar ice cap between the Americas and Eurasia has never been breached either for purposes of war or peace. Only the development of modern aviation has revealed the possibilities of flight over the top of the world.

Another natural barrier of note is formed by the great desert and mountain belt extending from Dakar in Africa to the Bering Straits at the northern tip of Siberia. Throughout human history it has offered remarkable protection to the peoples living on either side. In a similar sense the Andes continue to discourage close contact between the nations of western and eastern South America. And the great desert of Australia, in addition to the British navy, gave the peoples of that continent a real sense of security until the present war.

NATURAL BARRIERS



While most of the above-mentioned natural defense barriers of the earth have provided a high degree of protection from attack, there is no nation which has been perpetually free from invasion. Although land forces will always utilize, if possible, valleys and fertile plains in breaching the frontiers of their enemies, deserts and mountains can usually be crossed at some point when necessity arises.

SPACE AS A BARRIER

Of all the natural means of protection, however, *distance* or *space* is the most important. If a nation's territory is large enough and its armies remain intact, space offers the possibility of retreat until the communications of the enemy have become too extended to gather force for a knockout blow. This has been the story of the German attack upon the vastness of Russia and the Japanese invasion of China. It could likewise be true of an invading force on American soil, to which the further advantage of the spaciousness of surrounding seas must be added.

Distance or space has, therefore, significance in transoceanic warfare as well. Almost immediately upon the outbreak of war in 1939, and despite the enormous size of her merchant fleet, the British found the burden of distance to the outlying essential parts of her empire almost beyond her strength. Had it not been for American aid, it is very probable that the space of the ocean highways would have worked as effectively in aiding the Axis attack upon the "lifeline of Empire" as it has frustrated the Nazi attempts to subdue the land power of Russia.

The bombing of Pearl Harbor, too, resulted in literally trebling the distance which the American fleet had to travel to establish some line of defense in the Far East. The Great Circle route from San Francisco or Hawaii to the Philippines was instantly closed, which meant that our ships had to ply their tortuous way

around Africa or through the southern Pacific in order to reach the already threatened outpost of empire at Singapore, or the last line of defense in Australia and New Zealand.

MOBILITY

World War II has indeed provided many interesting and generally unforeseen changes in the conduct of warfare as well as on the relative position of the Great Powers. One of the most important of these is the factor of mobility in relation to naval and military strategy.

It was not until the development of modern transportation by rail and hard-surface roads that land power began to achieve superiority of defense over sea power, by virtue of greater mobility in the concentration of larger forces to meet an ocean-borne attack. Up to the middle of the last century sea power had on numerous occasions shown its ability to establish a bridge-head on hostile shores before the armies of the invaded country could concentrate sufficient force to drive off the invaders. The Crimean War in which the sea-borne armies of Britain defeated the Russians on their own shore, marked the last important historic instance of successful attack by a sea power upon a land power.

LAND POWER VS. SEA POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD

There have been, of course, many instances of the invasion of countries by sea following the Crimean War. But in all cases they involved an attack by a vastly superior Power upon a weak or backward nation. The occupation of Mexico by Napoleon III and the American defeat of the Spanish forces in Cuba, are examples in point. The first real test in recent times came, however, during World War I. It ended in the disastrous defeat of the British at Gallipoli, where Turkish and German land forces were able to concentrate in superior numbers.

During the past century, therefore, the growth of mobility on land and sea and more recent developments in aviation have altered many preconceived rules of strategy and tactics. A complete cycle has apparently been made with respect to the defensive and offensive advantages of sea power in relation to land power, judging by the demonstrated ability of Anglo-American forces to breach the Fortress of Europe.


Ever since the rise of British sea power, and until the present war, the Imperial navy has gone on the assumption that control of the ocean highways could be maintained provided it possessed a sufficient number of ships and properly located bases. While the British recognized that improved mobility on land made it difficult if not impossible to attack the hostile shores of a land power from the sea, they likewise assumed that so long as the fleet was superior, a continental enemy could not cut the "lifelines of empire" upon which British power essentially rested. A brief historical survey of the British situation in this regard will serve to clarify the contemporary problem of global war.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE MARGINAL SEAS

The Eurasian continent, except for the icebound North, is entirely rimmed by marginal and closed seas. From the very beginning of British colonial expansion her statesmen and naval commanders developed a keen appreciation of the vital importance of the control of these seas. Because if the nations of Europe or Asia could once break out from their shores and cut at any point the Imperial trade routes around the Continent, British naval security would be dangerously threatened if not destroyed.

A study of the accompanying map, which includes Eurasia, Africa and Australia, reveals the fact that in the long history of their expansion the British have acquired naval bases located at

LIFELINES OF EMPIRE



the most strategic points along the principal marginal seas and ocean highways. The British Isles, of course, gave control of the English Channel, the North Sea, and the outlet from the Baltic to the Atlantic Ocean. By their possession of Gibraltar, Malta and Port Said the British navy could maintain command of the world's most important inland sea, provided the fleets of Italy or France remained sufficiently inferior. Similarly Suez, Port Sudan, and Aden assured control both of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea through which British merchant ships and men-of-war could sail in peace into the vast Indian Ocean, on whose shores so many British possessions lie.

The anchor point of Britain's Far East command was Singapore, with Hongkong to the north, and Simonstown in South Africa and King George Sound in Australia controlling the southern entrances to the Indian Ocean. Preceding the rise of

German naval power in Europe and that of the Japanese in Asia, the British had likewise commanded Chinese waters. Following the Washington Treaties of 1922 they withdrew from their naval base at Weihaiwei in the Shantung Peninsula and only maintained Hongkong with insufficient defenses to protect it.

AMERICAN WATERS

In similar fashion the United States displaced the British in American waters and, with the defeat of the Spaniards and the construction of the Panama Canal, took over complete command of the Caribbean. While the British continued to hold their naval bases at Jamaica and Trinidad, as well as at Halifax and Bermuda to the north and in the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, these were in no way used as a challenge to American naval power.

In World War I, thanks to the aid of her Allies and the friendship of Japan, the outlying parts of the Empire offered no serious difficulties of defense. The situation in the present war, however, has proved to be quite different. For not only are the Japanese an enemy nation but the naval power of Germany and Italy has been strong enough to necessitate the concentration of major portions of the British fleet in European waters or for essential convoy duty. The result has been a disastrous weakening of the defense of her possessions in Asia with the loss of everything east of India in that part of the world.

AIR POWER AND NAVAL SECURITY

The fall of France in 1940, too, severed the only remaining bridgehead the British had in Europe. The simultaneous entry of Italy into the war likewise closed the Mediterranean. This was not due so much to the presence of a strong enemy fleet as to Axis control of the entire area through superiority in the air.

Unhappily, the tremendous significance of the relation of air

power to sea power was not fully appreciated in either Britain or America until after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and until the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies had fallen, and the armies of Rommel had nearly swept the shores of the Mediterranean. In all of these actions it was the superior air force of the attacking foe which gave the advantage, though in the case of the Japanese the swiftness of their movement was likewise aided by the larger numbers of their fleet and land forces.


MOBILITY ON LAND, SEA, AND IN THE AIR

It is with this background of recent experience that the astonishing contemporary improvement in the strategic position of the Anglo-American Powers assumes such significance. Once the lesson had been learned that air command was essential to naval command of marginal seas, the industrial might of Britain and America was turned to the production of the necessary ships and planes.

British and American sea power in conjunction with the land power of Russia, are definitely on the road to victory. The enemy nations in Europe, lying between these combined forces which now press inexorably toward one another, will be crushed to defeat. Similarly the Japanese are being brought to feel the combined might of Britain and America in conjunction with China.

Mobility in the air joined with increased mobility on land and sea are having, therefore, a profound effect upon the strategy of modern offensive and defensive operations. But the striking relationship in these respects between the land power of Russia and China on the one hand and the sea power of Britain and America on the other, has tremendous significance for the future peace as well as for the present war.

AXIS BETWEEN LAND POWERS AND SEA POWERS



In the maps on pages 69 and 72 is illustrated the peripheral position of the British Empire, with its chain of naval-air bases and colonial holdings around the fringe of the Eurasian continent. On the inner part of the circle lies the land mass of Russia, with united China facing the Pacific and disunited Europe facing the Atlantic. On the outer periphery, across these two world oceans, is continental United States.

It is quite obvious that certain of the nations located along the shores of Eurasia are capable of becoming powerful aggressors in the future, as some of them have been in the past. If at any time a single one or combination of these coastal states should establish air supremacy over their marginal seas, the lifeline of the British Empire would again be threatened. In a similar manner a combination of recalcitrant peoples in Europe, particularly in conjunction with a revived Japanese or newly born Chinese imperialism, would threaten both British and Russian security. In either event, the upsetting of the balance of power, which would result from the successful attainment of such designs, would gravely imperil the United States.

Eternal vigilance is the price of peace. Provided the closest Anglo-American-Russian cooperation can be maintained, together with that of France and China, there is little to be feared from areas of disturbance in either Europe or Asia. Without the constant and united functioning of these stabilizing forces the maintenance of peace will be put in jeopardy. For in the long run the security of each depends upon the security of all.

It is apparent, therefore, that the basic factors of foreign policy—Geographic, Economic, Demographic, and Strategic—must be understood if one is to comprehend the meaning of World War II and the future peace. Their relation to the position of the United States with respect to the post-war world will be the subject of the pages to follow.

7. U. S. Post-War World Position

The wise statesman understands that no foreign policy can be effective unless measured by the power and the intent of the nation to uphold it. America's traditional peacetime procedure of avoiding commitments and responsibilities abroad has frequently led to the unfortunate situation wherein the goals we have sought in our foreign policies have had no logical relation to the realities of the situation or have been far out of scale with measures we were willing to undertake in their defense. Such broad principles of conduct as "no entangling alliances," "open-door in China," and "outlawry of war as an instrument of policy," or such specific policies as "non-recognition of the fruits of conquest" and the "cash-and-carry" principle of neutrality, were all manifestations of an escapist and negative approach to world affairs. They were based either on the dangerous assumption that they could be applied without the risk of force or on the naive faith that the "moral sanction" was sufficient in this unmoral world.

Under such conditions, America has been able to exert very little direct control over international developments affecting our vital interests. For we have not only refused to participate wholeheartedly in any collective peace system but we have similarly declared against any trafficking with the balance-of-power game. In consequence, we have been drawn, against our will, into two Great-Power wars within a single generation; and each time we were caught badly off balance and unprepared.

OUR PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the Department of State published a "White Paper" containing a selected record of our pre-war

diplomacy. This highly interesting document indicated with justification that everything possible had been done on the diplomatic front to avoid war. What it did not state, but what its contents inadvertently confirmed, was the fact that no close or permanent coordination between the defense and the policy-determining branches of the government had ever really existed. Yet, in this contemporary world of power politics, any sound national strategy demanded the most intimate and continuous collaboration between those responsible for direct dealings with nations abroad and those whose duty it was to defend the policies we supposedly stood for.

Our shortcomings in these respects cannot be placed alone at the door of the Federal Administration. They are rather the true reflection of the public mind. Americans have always viewed with distrust the "meddling" of generals and admirals with foreign policy. In their desire to avoid the tyranny of a "military caste" they have failed to understand the necessity of, and therefore have never insisted upon, a proper coordination of arms with policy in time of peace, as well as in time of war.

COMMITMENTS AND POWER

This lack of understanding of the important relation between policy and arms has been illustrated on many occasions during the past quarter century. The Kellogg Pact was a striking example of America's failure to realize that to outlaw war as an instrument of policy did not dispose of the problem of enforcing peace. More recent and specific examples can be drawn from our pre-war policies with respect to Japan, Germany and Italy. The nonrecognition of conquests, the imposition of embargoes, the material aid given to the aggressors themselves as well as their victims under the guise of neutrality, not only failed to enforce our position but made us ridiculous in the eyes of our potential

enemies. This was because they knew right along that we did not intend at the time to back our words with deeds.

Walter Lippmann¹ recently pointed out that American foreign policy has been "insolvent" because we have rarely understood the importance of balancing our commitments abroad with our national power to enforce them. A "*commitment*," he defines as "an obligation outside the continental limits of the United States, which may in the last analysis have to be met by waging war." "*Power*," on the other hand, is "the force which is necessary to prevent such a war or win it if it cannot be prevented."

In contemplating the future, the demands and circumstances of what Wendell Willkie² has called "One World," should be added to these basic elements of responsible relations abroad. The pursuit by America of selfish, isolationist policies after the war will work to our own disadvantage by drawing too heavily upon "the gigantic reservoir of good-will" which at present exists in most parts of the world towards this country.

America possesses instruments of power beyond anything hitherto held by a people. History warns, nevertheless, that no nation has ever achieved a comparable position without causing thereby grave mistrust. Our humanitarian instincts and good intentions, fortunately, have given a basis for the belief abroad that our motives are sincere and our efforts dedicated to freedom's cause and not to selfish aggrandizement. This is the basis of the "Good Neighbor Policy," one we can ill afford not to implement in Europe and Asia as well as in the Americas.

THE PRICE OF POWER

The price of power is responsibility, and responsibility, individual or collective, is one thing we have usually sought as a nation

¹Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy—Shield of the Republic*, Little, Brown and Co., 1943.

²Wendell L. Willkie, *One World*, Simon and Schuster, 1943.

to avoid. America's true greatness can only prove itself provided we try to use our power in such a way as to make possible the realization of constructive world peace. In the accomplishment of this task all our foreign commitments must be kept in balance with our intent to enforce them and our policies so designed as to hold intact our priceless "reservoir of good-will." For no peace can be assured without the collective authority of all freedom-loving nations, of which we are one.

What then are the elements of American power and how are they to be related to future policy? In answering this question for ourselves we must always keep in mind the situation of the United States in respect to the four basic factors of foreign policy—*geographic, economic, demographic* and *strategic*. These can be summarized as follows:

OUR GEOGRAPHIC POSITION

Under the first, or *geographic* factor, it is evident that the favorable *world* location of the United States as to the major reserves of coal and iron (see map page 4) has made possible a gigantic industrial development equal to the rest of the world combined (see pages 36 and 44). Our interoceanic situation, too, has placed this country at the very center of the trade routes of the globe (see page 26).

The United States is the only Great Power whose shores give directly both upon the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. The opening of the Panama Canal has enabled us to take full advantage of this situation. We now function strategically as well as commercially like a vast continental island with direct access by sea from all our ports to the shores of Europe, Asia, Africa and South America.

Since the United States is also the only Great Power within the Western Hemisphere, this aspect of our *regional* location

provides freedom from fear of attack by our immediate neighbors. In contrast to the situation of the other Great Powers, whose regional concerns in this respect are paramount, the only real source of danger to us comes from across the seas.

The interregional position of the United States is less significant from the fact of our territorial possessions outside the Western Hemisphere than from the reaction of other nations at all times to the impact of our power upon them abroad. Since American armed forces, moreover, have a direct stake in every region of the world in global war, it is obvious that American national interests must likewise be similarly involved in global peace. This is a situation particularly related to the second, or *economic* factor of foreign policy.

OUR ECONOMIC POSITION

America's industrial, commercial and financial position has become so important that any economic policy we adopt, whether domestic or foreign, is of real concern to all other nations. The size, too, of our home market and our purchasing power, especially the high proportion of the world's raw material and luxury goods output which we consume, have created a general dependence abroad upon our economy. America's capacity for the production of arms, furthermore, is so stupendous as to be in many respects the most important factor in world affairs.

It is, of course, logical that the impact of America upon other nations should produce certain reactions on their part, purely as a matter of self-protection. These reactions are inevitably cumulative and can eventually produce situations totally contrary to what we first anticipated. The Republican Tariff and War Debt policies of the "twenties" and the New Deal financial policies of the "thirties," though considered as purely "domestic" matters, were not only world-shaking events but led to the adoption

of self-protective measures on the part of other states which eventually resulted in the complete breakdown of international economic order.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

The third factor of foreign policy, the *demographic*, is related in several important respects to our power position. It should be noted, in the first place, that only the British Empire, Soviet Russia and China outrank the United States in size of population. Of greater significance is the fact that our proportion of trained technicians and skilled workers, who form the indispensable human element of industrial strength, exceeds that of all other countries.

From the *ethnic* point of view America has become a melting pot of the world's races and cultures. This variety in the content of our population will in the long run prove to be a tremendous source of strength. Much adjustment still has to be made, though the processes of integration are being greatly speeded by the common experiences and trials of present-day world affairs.

Racially, of course, the white elements of the population predominate, the Negro forming a considerable minority and the proportion of the yellow and brown peoples being extremely small. Culturally all groups have made their contribution to the artistic, scientific and scholastic wealth of the New World.

So far as concerns our foreign relations it is peculiarly important that American policy should reflect the combined and constructive desires of all sections of the population. Certain people of European origin still tend on occasion to become deeply involved in the policies and politics of their countries of origin. What is needed today is the contribution of every group, irrespective of national or racial origin, to the development of a sound American foreign policy whether applied to Europe, the Orient or elsewhere.

THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

With regard to the fourth, or *strategic* factor, it is clear that continental United States has all the natural advantages of defense provided by vastness of territory and island position. On the other hand, modern developments in mobility on land and sea and in the air have reduced enormously the protective value of the world's oceans. They are rather highways for attack under present conditions, as we discovered to our sorrow at Pearl Harbor and as the Axis is now learning from the lash of America's ocean-borne fury.

Strategically, therefore, the strength of America is reinforced beyond that of any other nation by virtue of its geographic position, economic power and a large and highly skilled population. Before drawing general conclusions as to our future foreign policy, however, a summary should be made of the more important material aspects of our power position.

The United States, which represents 6% of the world's population and about 7% of its land area, will have at its command at the close of the war the following approximate percentages of the world's supply of the instruments of national power:

- 80% of the gold
- 60% of the silver
- 60% of the war industries
- 60% of the peace industries
- 65% of the naval units
- 70% of the merchant marine
- 75% of the transport and commercial planes
- 60% of the fighting and bombing planes

While our armed forces of between 10 and 12 millions will be outnumbered by our Allies', their equipment will be sufficient to enable them to stand back of any reasonable demands we may

have to make with respect to peace arrangements. Furthermore, they will be well-established in key land and sea areas both of Europe and Asia and in a position to remain there if necessary.

Another element of very great importance is the fact that, unlike the other Powers, America's vast industrial plant will emerge from the war intact and undamaged by bombing. This means that the United States, which represents more than half of the industrial capacity of the world, will be ready to turn the might of its mass production technique immediately to the output of peacetime goods for foreign as well as domestic consumption. In contrast, all the other Powers must not only repair their damaged factories but devote a major part of their energies to the reconstruction of their cities, transport facilities and farms and to the relief of their war-weary populations. While eventually the recovery of most of the other industrial nations from the devastation of the war will reduce proportionately the comparative power of the United States, this country will nevertheless continue to maintain a position of primacy with all that that implies to world relations.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

It is evident, therefore, that the United States will have at its command the money, industry, commerce and arms necessary to initiate any policies we may choose to follow in our post-war relations abroad. We can return to the traditions of isolation, and in allegiance to the deceptive principles of sovereignty and freedom of action avoid any or all commitments essential to an effective world organization and security system. We can join a "League of Nations" in which we subscribe in words if not in deeds to the demands of international peace. We can continue to play an enforced and tenuous balance-of-power game by again allying ourselves, at the last desperate moment, with a coalition of nations

who have become victims of aggression. But though we have the power to do these things, we shall not be able to exert thereby the necessary control over circumstances from which ultimate peril to our security can arise. Nor shall we avoid having to face three very sober considerations:

(1) Our immediate post-war policies, whether isolationist or co-operationist in spirit and in trend, will determine accordingly the pattern of the peace. The world position of the United States is so important that all nations must of necessity adjust their commitments to ours.

(2) Once the pattern of the peace has thus been set, whether on the basis of international anarchy or effective world cooperation, it will become increasingly difficult to change. This is because of the gathering momentum of post-war developments, initiated by our own original policies.

(3) In any case, the United States can never escape the consequences and repercussions abroad of its domestic as well as its foreign policies, whatever they may be.

The American people are fast approaching the hour of decision. Whether they will act wisely, whether the policies they determine upon will be such as to bring security to the nation and peace to mankind, must depend upon how far their minds encompass the basic realities of world relations and of America's power, outlined in the chapters above.

Two Great Power wars within a single generation should have taught us that most of our traditional foreign policies offer no guarantee of security. Likewise clearly indicated is the fact that the rise of any aggressive nation or combination of nations in Europe and Asia, capable of dominating either continent, will imperil America. Logically, therefore, anything that we can do to prevent the onset of such dangers on the Eurasian continent will be to our own best interest.

THE END OF ISOLATION

If we have learned at last the lessons of history, if we have come to an understanding of the meaning and responsibilities of our world position, there will be but one general course of action open to us. It includes a direct and permanent concern in the affairs of Europe and Asia, in addition to the Americas, as an essential guarantee of our own national security. It involves the utilization of our power in the control of events affecting our vital interests and in the establishment and maintenance of a collective world security system. It means the abandonment of many of our traditional policies through the assumption of responsibilities for world order, hitherto avoided in time of peace. It imposes a frank and courageous acceptance of the logic of events which can no longer be ignored, unless we are again to become the hapless victims of circumstances over which we refuse to exercise any control. And finally, it requires the recognition of the fact that America has the physical and material means to do these things, provided it has at the same time the understanding, the will, and the leadership.

No one can foretell in detail the demands and circumstances of the future peace. These will unfold in due course and must be met as they arise. Of one thing, however, we may be certain. If America decides to pledge its national policies, as under the Fulbright Resolution, to "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to prevent future aggression and to maintain lasting peace," then there can be no reservations made with respect to whatever may prove necessary in the attainment of these goals. Peace as well as war is an all-out proposition.

PREREQUISITES TO PEACE

There are two definite prerequisites to peace in the achievement of which the United States must play a major role. First com-

plete agreement between the British Empire, Soviet Russia and the United States on all important details of the post-war world order must be brought about, since these nations alone will represent, at the outset, the reality of power which can give substance to the peace and sanction to its arrangements. Second, the bases of political order and economic stability must be established both in Europe and in Asia before any permanent regional and world organizations for peace can possibly function.

These are obviously very complicated matters. A British-American-Russian settlement can develop into an intolerable monopoly of world power. To avoid this it should obviously be established within and by the consent of the United Nations group as a whole, in recognition of the fact that global peace as well as global war is essentially a Great Power problem. The Big Three can thus be made to function as the reality of power behind the peace machinery, a reality to which all freedom-loving nations great and small, enjoying its protection, can and should contribute according to their means. Its purpose would be, not that of opposing, but that of making possible necessary peaceful change in world relations. Only by such means could it translate into universal terms the American policy of the Good Neighbor.

The restoration of political order and economic stability in Europe and Asia will also present stupendous difficulties. In the first place a "power vacuum" will exist in both regions of the world at the close of the war. This situation will be further complicated by general privation and other elements of disintegration which are bound to result in disturbances of serious proportions. These alone will be enough to put to severest test the concert of the Big Three.

In Europe, neither France nor the smaller democracies can possibly shoulder in the beginning the necessary burdens for the maintenance of peace. Similarly in the Far East, China's internal

weakness will not yet permit her to assume obligations commensurate with her political and moral status as a Great Power. Some international occupation of key strategic points in both regions may have to be maintained, therefore, until such time as these protected areas can administer relief and maintain order for themselves.

In Europe the major tasks will be the redrawing of political frontiers, the re-establishment of industry, agriculture, commerce and financial stability, the creation of machinery for the administration of post-war arrangements and the maintenance of order. In the Far East we must aid in rebuilding the entire economic structure of China, as well as that of many other parts of the Asiatic region. The whole colonial question, including India, must be settled in such a way that the subject peoples concerned will be given the opportunity of achieving timely self-government and independence. And finally, the various political units, Colonial, Independent and Great Power, must be brought together under some workable regional organization for the peaceful solution of the problems of reconstruction, and the maintenance of order.

Such in broadest outlines are the preliminaries of peace. The hazards involved are obviously very great. The problems which are bound to arise in the general liquidation of the war and in the attempt at reconstruction of the political and economic life of Europe and Asia are stupendous. Similarly the task of developing either regional councils or a world Association of Nations will pale to insignificance the difficulties of organization and authority faced by the League of Nations.

THE SUPERSTATE IN A GREAT POWER WORLD

In considering these questions there should likewise be no illusion over the fact that this is still a Great Power world, in which all nations will continue to cling to the concept of sovereignty. Such

being the case, they are in no way prepared to accept the full implications of superstate authority with international police powers, though in practice they may eventually achieve the reality of this type of world organization. Circumstances will naturally force from the beginning the conformance of all nations to certain universal regulations. Many world-wide administrative agencies having extraordinarily large powers must of necessity be established and made to function. Such matters as relief, rehabilitation, international transport and communications, stabilization of commerce and trade relations and other economic and social problems are clearly subject to degrees of regional and world regulation. But these things can only be realized by common consent and with the backing of the Great Powers, not by the imposed authority of some superstate.

The alternatives of future policy are neither pleasant nor easy. These are times, however, when national greatness calls for the assumption of responsibilities, since neither virtue nor protecting oceans can longer serve as a shield of the Republic. Twice we shall have proved to ourselves that we can fight and win a transoceanic war. America will soon face the most difficult task of all—the winning of a transoceanic peace.

HOW WORLD MAPS ARE MADE

B. T.

Suppose you are traveling from Albany to Boston and get lost in a town called Fitchburg. You will probably pull out a road map. From the map you will learn that Boston is due east and is some thirty miles away. You will also learn, probably, that the state of Massachusetts looks somewhat like an old-fashioned telephone receiver and is about one and a half times larger than Connecticut. In short, you assume that the map will tell you (1) distance, (2) direction, (3) the shape of the land, (4) the size of the area. And usually a map does tell you these things quite accurately.

But if you think that a world map can also tell you all these things you are very much mistaken. There isn't a single world projection that can tell you distance, direction, shape and size all at once. The trouble is that the earth is spherical and the map is flat, and the curved surface cannot be transferred to a flat surface. There is very little error when a map covers a small area like a city or a state, but when it covers the whole of the United States the error becomes noticeable, when it covers a big area like the Pacific Ocean the error becomes great enough to worry military strategists, and when it covers the whole of the world the error becomes so great that it is practically impossible to convey any adequate picture of the world.

The only map of the world that can tell you distance, direction, shape and size correctly is the globe, but the globe is an awkward thing to carry in your pocket and furthermore you cannot look at all its surfaces at the same time.



A plain picture of the globe which is known to map makers as the orthographic projection has much the same drawbacks. In the maps above, you cannot see the other side of the world when you are looking at the Americas, and when you are looking at North America South America looks compressed, while when you are looking at South America North America looks contracted.

If you look at a globe closely, you may notice that it is covered with leaf-shaped gores. If these gores were peeled off and laid on a flat surface they would look like this:




These sections all represent the surface of the earth correctly, but they are disconnected and it is difficult to visualize the whole.

If we make each leaf-shaped piece square-edged so that the



whole globe appears on a rectangle it is easier to read, but since we have stretched out the polar sections horizontally they have become elongated in shape and the scale has become different from the unstretched section. Now if we stretch the northern and southern regions vertically in the same proportion we will regain the correct shape, although the scale will become still more distorted. This world map is known as the Mercator projection, which is the one you will find in all school rooms. It is more or less correct as to the shapes of the land masses but is totally incorrect as to their relative sizes. Greenland, which is actually one-third the size of the United States, looks about twice its size. But



the Mercator projection always keeps the north at the top, and straight lines always show true directions. For these reasons it is used extensively for navigation.

The distortion of size in the Mercator was caused by our stretching the polar regions so that the poles which are points actually stretched to equal the length of the equator. By reducing the poles again to points we can avoid this difficulty, and map the world in an oval or lozenge shape. This time we have less stretching to do, and the relative sizes of the land areas can stay uniform.



This type of map with uniform area scale is called an equal-area map. These maps tell us accurately the relative size of continents, oceans, nations, etc., but the trouble is that, as you can readily see

from the illustration, the shapes are so distorted along the shoulders that one can hardly recognize the common land configurations.

To overcome this difficulty it has been suggested that the poles be represented by half the length of the equator. This will lessen the distortion around the edges, but it does not overcome the distortion completely. This is an easy map to read and extensively used in Europe.



Another way of overcoming the difficulty is to split the world into segments as illustrated here, and on the following page.





Now we have more or less correct pictures of the continents, both in shape and in size, but the relationship between the continents is completely distorted.

All the projections we have discussed are centered around the equator and are most accurate around the equator, but since the centers of civilization are in the temperate zones and the current war is being fought mostly in the northern hemisphere, projections with the north pole at the center have also become useful. These are not new projections—they are just projections with a new point of view. They can be made so that areas are equal




LAMBERT'S POLAR MAP



STEREOGRAPHIC POLAR MAP



POLAR AZIMUTHAL MAP



POLAR GNOMONIC MAP

(Lambert's polar projection), or so that the shapes of the lands remain correct (stereographic polar projection), or so that distances along the meridians are correct from the north pole to any point in the world (polar azimuthal projection), or in such a way that any straight line from point to point on the map marks the shortest course between those points on the earth (polar gnomonic projection). The last one is a very distorted map and it can cover only a part of a hemisphere, but since it is correct as to direction it is used for flying.

In all these polar projections the distortion below the equator is great. To avoid this it has been suggested that the area below the equator be split as shown in the maps on the following page. These are probably the most satisfactory polar projections.

We have described most of the common world projections. None of them alone can give us accurate distance, direction, shape and size in any one map. But there are usually several projections suitable for particular purposes. If, for instance, you are comparing the sizes of different continents any one of the equal-area projections will be adequate. If you are showing the shortest dis-



tance from New York to Archangel the gnomonic projection is most suitable. In the days of discovery and exploration the "Mercator world" was quite satisfactory. But today, in the age of aviation and radio, when we are tied to the rest of the world in so many ways, the picture of the world has also become more complex. And we are forced to become multi-map minded.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Brooks Emeny is President of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, with which he has been associated since 1935. A graduate of Princeton, he likewise holds a Ph.D. from Yale. His extensive travels throughout the world, which were partly spent in a number of years of graduate study abroad, have given him a wide acquaintance among persons prominent in international affairs. He is the author of *The Strategy of Raw Materials* and other books and articles, and co-author with the late Frank Simonds of *The Great Powers in World Politics*.

B.T. is the member of Graphic Associates who made the maps and charts for *Mainsprings of World Politics*.

Mainsprings of World Politics is the fourth in the series of *Social Action* issues which we now publish in cooperation with the Foreign Policy Association as a special service to our readers. The three previous issues have been:

Struggle for World Order, by Vera M. Dean—Nov. 1941

Uniting Today for Tomorrow, by Grayson Kirk and Walter Sharp—
Oct. 1942

America's Foreign Policies, by Thomas A. Bailey—May, 1943.

You may obtain these three issues (which sell at 25c. each)—

—and a year's subscription to *Social Action*, if you are not now a subscriber, for \$1.50. (Sorry—this offer is good only for new subscriptions.)

If you are a subscriber and want this combination, the magazine can be sent as a gift, either now or at Christmas time, to a friend in your name.

—and a copy of Dwight J. Bradley's new book, "Freedom of the Soul," for \$1.75.

* * * *

"**A book for our time,**" writes Pierre van Paassen of Dwight J. Bradley's new book, "Freedom of the Soul," in *The Protestant*. He also says: "This book, which sees a spiritual awakening in the offing for the American people as the only road to swerve the nation into the stream of human freedom, is highly recommended to all men and women to whom the Kingdom of God is the paramount value in life."

Special Offer: "Freedom of the Soul" (\$1.50) and one year's subscription to *Social Action*, new or renewal, for \$2.00.

* * * *

Preview

"War Guilt" in the November *Social Action*, by Walter Horton, Professor at Oberlin Graduate School of Theology. What should be the Christian attitude toward defeated enemies when these can be properly adjudged guilty of aggression in the war?

"Outline of a Working Faith," in December, by Dr. Kathleen MacArthur. Dr. MacArthur, Secretary for Religious Resources for the National Board of the Y.W.C.A., defines the seven profound beliefs which Christians of all faiths have in common. Basic for all *Social Action* groups of every age.

SOMEWHERE AN ISLAND

By Gilbert Maxwell

Somewhere exists an island, though not here,
Where stars alone light summer's night, where fall
Sweeter than Strauss upon the tranquil ear,
The notes of the night bird's call. . . .

What is that island, where is it now?

You ask, and I reply:

It is a place where mortals wear no mask

Nor hide in the ground nor die

In sea or sky.

It is a place where hate, cold treachery, and fear
Sever no friends apart.

In it endures no date of careless treaties left to celebrate

With a remorseful tear. . . .

But where, oh, where is it now? you ask, who wait,

And I reply: alas, not there, not here,

Nor ever in any place save in a state

Called future in the country of man's heart.

—Reprinted by special permission
of Harper's Magazine